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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Osborne, Martin J. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Rubinstein, Ariel | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-17T06:42:13Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-11-17T06:42:13Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1990 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/64 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash’s work in the early 1950s. In this book we discuss two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets. | en_US |
dc.publisher | Academic Press Limited | en_US |
dc.subject | Game Theory | en_US |
dc.subject | Negotiation | en_US |
dc.subject | Capitalism | en_US |
dc.subject | Rubinstein, Ariel | en_US |
dc.title | Bargaining and Markets | en_US |
dc.type | Book | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Bargaining and Markets |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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downloadme (2).pdf | Bargaining and Markets | 1.5 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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